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ADMIRALTY-CREWMAN'S INSANITY RENDERS SHIP UNSEAWORTHY-

ABSOLUTE LIABILITY FOR SAME DESPITE OWNER'S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE-

Plaintiff, an able-bodied seaman on board defendant's ship, had a quarrel
with the second cook and struck him. The cook went to the galley and returned with a meat cleaver with which he split plaintiff's skull. Plaintiff
sued for personal injuries under the general maritime law. His contention
was that the insanity of a crewman rendered the ship "unseaworthy," and
that liability attached to the owners regardless of whether they knew of
his dangerous propensities. The Court of Appeals upheld this contention.1
Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1952), petition
for cert. filed, 20 U.S.L. WEEK 3293 (U.S. May 3, 1952).
The doctrinal statement of the admiralty courts in suits by seamen for
personal injuries is that the vessel and her owner are liable to indemnify
seamen for injuries received by them in consequence of the unseaworthiness
of the ship.2 A suitable definition of "unseaworthiness" which could
encompass all cases has never been found. However, seaworthiness in the
physical sense has been fairly well defined. If a vessel is not "strong,
staunch and fit in the hull for the voyage . . . [and] also . . . properly

equipped," 8 the seaman can recover for injuries which result from the
defective condition, 4 even in the absence of negligence on the part of the
owner. 5 A, ship may be physically seaworthy and yet unseaworthy with
respect to personnel. Where such has been held prior to the instant case,
the owner of the vessel has had knowledge, or should have known, of the
alleged incapacity of the crew. Thus, where an entire crew was incompetent
because of inability to speak their officers' language, the owner was liable
for injuries to passenger and crew resulting therefrom. 6 The liberality of
1. The actual holding of the case was that it was reversible error for the judge
to exclude evidence of the cook's insanity. The judge did so on the ground that
temperamental unfitness for duty did not give rise to liability unless it had come to
defendant's knowledge. Since the Court of Appeals decided that knowledge was
unnecessary, the evidence should have been admitted.

2. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1902).
3. The Rolph, 299 Fed. 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1924).
4. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1902) ; Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259
U.S. 255 (1922).
5. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1943); The Scandrett, 87 F.2d
708 (2d Cir. 1937).
6. In re Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 130 Fed. 76 (9th Cir. 1904). Here the ship had
white officers and a Chinese crew who could not understand English. Great confusion resulted when the ship struck a reef and went down. Due to the language
barrier, only three of the ten lifeboats were launched and many lives were lost. The
court made no distinction between the passengers and the one crewman who lost his
life. They felt the fellow servant rule was no defense to "unseaworthiness." Id.
at 83. Also see National Shipbuilding Co. v. Mallia, 243 S.W. 757, 759, 761 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1922).
The same seems to be the rule where the master is incompetent. Spellman v.
American Barge Line, 176 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1949) semble.
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the courts in tagging ships unseaworthy as to personnel in the interest of
seamen's recovery 7 is well illustrated by The Rolph,8 where the skipper
hired a well known bully as a mate. A crewman was allowed to recover
for injuries sustained at the hands of the mate on the grounds that the ship
was "unseaworthy" as not being properly manned where the owner, by his
agent, should have known of the mate's brutality. 9 However, Judge
Learned Hand now repudiates knowledge as a requirement to recovery, 10
and if a crewman is not "equal in disposition and seamanship to the ordinary
men in the calling,""
liability attaches to the owner regardless of
knowledge.
The rationale offered for imposing practically absolute liability on the
shipowner for injuries due to physical unseaworthiness is that the crewman
is bound to use the equipment and the vessel furnished by the owners, and
has less freedom to avoid the risk than if he were on land.' 2 Such a
rationale applies fully to the instant case where the crewman has to be
cooped up with the insane cook for the entire period of the voyage, yet
this theory was not mentioned by Judge Hand. In reaching his result
he relied upon the insurance theory of liability.' 3 When confronted with
the argument that the burden as regards selection of the crew that would
be imposed on shipowners by the instant case is intolerable, he said:
"[T]hat is no reason why an individual seaman who has suffered because
his fellow servant is not up to his work, must bear the loss. Substantially
all maritime risks are insured, and if we must suppose that the addition
of this risk will show in the premiums, in the end it will be likely also to
show in freight rates; and so far as it does, the recovery will be spread
among those who use the ships." 14 It is comforting that so eminent a
jurist articulated the motivating force behind the decision. But unfortunately for the administrators of the pre-employment examination, a determination of what is equality "in disposition and seamanship to the ordinary
men in the calling" must be left to the ad hoc process.
7. If the ship is seaworthy, the crewman is left to an action for damages under
the Jones Act, 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1946). That action is based
on negligence and is subject to reduction in damages for contributory negligence. See
generally 4 BmiNicr, ADMIRALTY 202-205 (6th ed. 1940).
8. 293 Fed. 269 (N.D. Cal. 1923), affd, 299 Fed. 52 (9th Cir. 1924).
9. 293 Fed. at 272, 299 Fed. at 55.
10. "We can see no reason for saying that, although the owner is liable if the
ship's plates are started without his knowledge, he is not liable if he signs on a
homicidal paranoic, whose appearance does not betray his disposition." Instant case
at 518.
11. Instant case at 518.
12. The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 122 (1935) ; Beadle v. Spencer, 298
U.S. 124, 129 (1935) ; Storgard v. France and Canada S.S. Co., 263 Fed. 545, 547
(2d Cir. 1920).
13. This was decried recently in Pound, Philosophy of Law and Comparative
Law, 100 U. oF PA. L. Ryv. 1, 8-13 (1951).
14. Instant case at 518.
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BANKRUPTCY-ELECTION OF TRUSTEE-CREDITOR CORPORATION WITH
SAM= OWNERSHIP AS BANKRUPT NOT DISENFRANCHISED--A and B each

owned one half the stock of a bankrupt corporation and also owned the
stock of one of its corporate creditors in the same proportion. A was president of both corporations. Over the objections of other creditors, the
referee in bankruptcy allowed A, as proxy for the creditor corporation, to
vote for the trustee in bankruptcy. This ballot created a deadlock which
required the referee to appoint the trustee.' The district court approved
this procedure. On appeal, an objecting creditor contended that the
creditor corporation should have been disenfranchised by operation of
§ 44(a) 2 of the Chandler Act which denies a vote in the election of the
the bankrupt's relatives or, where the bankrupt is a cortrustee to "...
its stockholders or members, its officers, and the memporation, .
bers of its board of directors or trustees or of other similar controlling
bodies. . . ." The court of appeals affirmed the decision below on the
ground that the corporate creditor was not within any class of creditors
denied participation by the statute. Nor would the court intervene in the
exercise of its equity powers in the absence of a showing that the election
was bankrupt controlled. 8 Schwartz v. Mills, 192 F.2d 727 (2nd Cir.

1951).
Case law before the Chandler Act did not automatically disenfranchise
creditor stockholders, officers and directors of a corporate bankrupt in the
election of the trustee,4 but only when circumstances suggested an unusual
danger of collusion between them and the bankrupt 5 Other creditors could
1. The creditor corporation voted a majority in amount of the total claims for
one candidate. A majority in number of claims over fifty dollars were voted for
his opponent. For election, a majority in number of claims over fifty dollars and
a majority in amount of all claims must be voted for one candidate. 52 STAT. 865
(1938), 11 U.S.C. §92 (1946). If no candidate can be elected, the referee appoints
a trustee. 52 STAT. 860 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §72 (1946).
2. 52 STAT. 860 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §72 (1946).
3. Petitioner made another and distinct appeal to the equity powers of the
court. This was to disallow creditor corporation's claim on the ground that the
claimant and the bankrupt should be considered as one because of their common
ownership. Then the claimant could not properly be considered as a creditor of the
bankrupt and could not vote. Such a disallowance was made in In re Loewer's
Gambrinus Brewery Co., 167 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1948) after the election of a trustee
on facts closely similar to those here presented. In the instant case, the court
properly held that piercing the corporate veil depends upon a weighing of all the
equities and that the delay necessary for a hearing on disallowance would be undesirable at the time of the initial allowance of claims for the purpose of electing a
trustee. The initial allowance is made summarily and does not operate as a decision
upon the validity of the creditor's claim in later proceedings. In re RosenfeldGoldman Co., 288 Fed. 921 (D. Mass. 1915).
4. Relatives: In re Rothleder, 232 Fed. 398 (S.D. N.Y. 1916) ; Stockholders:
Merchant's Nat. Bank v. Continental Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 232 Fed. 828 (9th Cir.
1916) ; In re Stradley & Co., 187 Fed. 285 (N.D. Ala. 1911) ; In re Syracuse Paper
& Pulp Co., 164 Fed. 275 (N.D. N.Y. 1908); Officers: In re Gloria VanderbiltSonia Gowns, 26 F. Supp. 766 (S.D. N.Y. 1938); Directors: In re Stradley & Co.,
supra;In re Syracuse Paper & Pulp Co., supra.
5. Relatives: In re Ballantine, 232 Fed. 271, 275 (S.D. ,N.Y. 1916) ; Officers:
Beale v. Snead, 81 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 685, rehearing
denied, 299 U.S. 619 (1936) ; In re Northern Iron Co., 18 Fed. Cas. 359, No. 10,322
(E.D. Mich. 1876).
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be disenfranchised on a showing of actual collusion.0 The bankrupt's relatives, stockholders, officers and directors were also entitled to vote as
proxies for a creditor, 7 except that if they appeared to be acting in the
bankrupt's interest they were subject to disqualification, s as were other
proxies found to be in collusion with the bankrupt. 9 The bankrupt's attorney was automatically barred from serving as proxy for a creditor.10 Dicta
since the Chandler Act indicates that the prior law regarding proxies
remains unchanged." While it has also been suggested that § 44(a) should
be construed to disenfranchise as proxies those classes disqualified to vote
as creditors, 12 the instant case adopts a contrary position in permitting the
proxy vote of a stockholder and officer of the bankrupt.
Section 44(a) of the Chandler Act was designed as a prophylactic
measure, making the law stricter by disqualifying as a matter of course those
who were ".

.

. regarded as having too close a connection with the

bankrupt to make it proper that their vote should be counted in the selection of the trustee. . .

. " 13

The purpose is to prevent the election of a

trustee partial to the bankrupt and adverse to creditor interests. In light
of the direction of the development of the law in this area, the argument
that this section limits the classes of creditors which may be summarily
disqualified is not persuasive.' 4 The legislative history '5 indicates an intent
to overrule the cases that did not automatically disenfranchise these most
recurrent categories. It is entirely silent as to other groups, but it would
seem that the rigorous rule here adopted might fittingly be viewed as
indicating a policy to guide the development of case law in related areas.
While a court might well refuse to be stricter than the statute, as for
example disqualifying as a voter the relative of an officer of a bankrupt corporation,'. it does not seem that it would be reaching as far as the statutory
6. In re Stowe, 235 Fed. 463 (N.D. Cal. 1916).
7. In re Franklin Tractor Co., 278 Fed. 732 (6th Cir. 1922). Both before and
after the Chandler Act the bankrupt's former attorney has been permitted to vote
as proxy for a creditor despite his former status. Before: It re Franklin Tractor
Co., 278 Fed. 732 (6th Cir. 1922) ; In re Sodus Packing Co., 1 F. Supp. 445 (W.D.
N.Y. 1932); cf. In re Rothleder, 232 Fed. 398 (S.D. N.Y. 1916). After: In re
Universal Seal Cap Co., 40 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. N.Y. 1941).
8. Director: In re L. W. Day & Co., 178 Fed. 545 (2d Cir. 1910) ; former attoriey: In re E. A. Walker & Co., 204 Fed. 132 (N.D. Ala. 1913); other agent:
In re McGill, 106 Fed. 57 (6th Cir. 1901).
9. In re Rekerdres, 108 Fed. 206 (S.D. N.Y. 1901).
10. In re Sitting, 182 Fed. 917 (N.D. N.Y. 1910); see In re Kaufman, 179
Fed. 552, 555 (W.D. Ky. 1910).
11. See In re Portage Wholesale Co., 183 F.2d 959, 961 (7th Cir. 1950) ; Sloan's
Furriers, Inc. v. Bradley, 146 F.2d 757, 758-759 (6th Cir. 1945).
12. 3 CoLLtr, BANKRU Tcy 48-49 (14th ed. 1941).
13. SaN. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 15 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 1409,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1937)
14. For a more fitting application of the maxim, inclasio unius est exclusio atterius to a section analogous to §44(a), see In re Luther, 63 F. Supp. 83 (W.D.

Mo. 1945), aff'd, 151 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 781 (1946).
15. SE N. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 15 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 1409,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1937).
16. In re Universal Seal Cap Co., 40 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. N.Y. 1941).

1952]

RECENT CASES

policy to hold that a creditor corporation subject to the same control as
the bankrupt cannot vote. This situation is closer to the pre-Chandler
cases which disenfranchised creditors shown to be bankrupt controlled,
than to the statutory classifications where there is disqualification simply
because of the danger of bankrupt control without inquiry into the actual
facts. A fortiori, after the ennunciation of policy in the act it would seem
that the creditor in the instant case should be disenfranchised.
Even if §44(a) is regarded as a definitive codification, excluding
resort to prior case law on related questions, the result of the present case
need not follow. While the creditor corporation is not literally within
any disqualified class, this seems a proper case to disregard the fiction of
corporate entity 17 and treat the owners of the corporation as the true
creditors for the purposes of § 44.18 Disenfranchisement would result from
such a piercing of the corporate veil since § 44 excludes the bankrupt's
stockholders from voting. The instant situation seems particularly to call
for such an approach since it is hardly in accordance with the policy of the
section to permit individuals who own and control the bankrupt to have a
deciding voice in the election of the trustee. Denying these stockholders a
vote need not affect the corporate claim or the standing of their corporation for the purposes of other sections of the act.1 9 In the present case it
appears that the creditor corporation's candidate, who was the trustee
appointed by the referee, was both disinterested and qualified 20 so that the
objecting creditors were harmed only in that their candidate was not
elected.21 The precedent, however, may well be harmful, for common
ownership of a bankrupt corporation and its creditor creates a situation
peculiarly susceptible to fraud which can not be readily proved. Disenfranchisement as a matter of law seems in these circumstances the most
prudent course.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-CONSPIRACY TO BREACH
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT AND DEPRIVE COVENANTEE OF RIGHT TO PURSUE
SOLVENT SELLER FOR DAMAGES-P, D1 and D2, adjoining land owners,
were parties to a covenant forbidding sale of their respective properties to
Negroes. D1 and D2 conveyed to D3, white and insolvent, who then
conveyed the properties to D4 and D5, Negroes. P brought an action in
tort for damages resulting from depreciated market value of his property.
He alleged a conspiracy among the defendants to violate the covenant, with
the purpose thereby to injure P's property value and to deprive him of
17. For this approach in other situations, see Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,
311 (1939) ; Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939).
18. See Frank, J., instant case at 732 (dissenting opinion); cf. note 3, supra.
19. The term "creditor" is used in different senses in different parts of the Bankruptcy Act. 2 REIsnnGToz, BANKRUPTCY § 695 (4th ed. 1940).
20. Instant case at 729.
21. This is a substantial right and entitled to the highest consideration. 2
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1645 (14th ed. 1941).
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his right to pursue a solvent seller on his claim for damages.' The trial
court sustained general demurrers to the petition. On appeal the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma reversed and remanded, holding that the petition stated
a cause of action for damages for conspiracy, construing the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Shelley v. Kraemer 2 as holding such covenants
valid and not precluding state courts from entertaining a damage action for
breach. Correll v. Earley, 237 P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1951).8
In Shelley v. Kraemer the Supreme Court held that enforcement by
state courts of restrictive covenants constituted state action and deprivation
of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court action specifically condemned in that case was restraint of violation of a covenant by ordering removal of the Negro buyer from the
premises. Previously, restrictive covenants had been upheld and enforced
in nearly all states which had ruled on them. 4 The Shelley case, decided
in 1948, did not declare invalid racial covenants as such, but reduced their
effectiveness as a means of continuing racial segregation by banning judicial
"enforcement." 5 Immediately various devices were suggested to circumvent the Court's ruling, but the consensus was that for various reasons
none of them would be effective.6 One question raised was whether Shelley
v. Kraemer precluded an action for damages against a seller who breached
a restrictive covenant-whether judicial award of damages would constitute
"state action" within the meaning of the Shelley case to give effect, though
less directly, to the covenant.7 In 1949 the Missouri court, in Weiss v.
1. This statement is the court's interpretation of the plaintiff's amended petition.
As the court noted, "the petition with its amendments is not skilfully drawn." 237
P.2d at 1021.
2. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
3. The trial court also sustained demurrers to alternative prayers for cancellation
of deeds and that judgment for damages be decreed a lien on the properties. This
ruling was affirmed on appeal on the strength of Shelley v. Kraemer.
4. See Scanlan, Racial Restrictions in Real Estate-Property Values versus
Humn. Values, 24 NoTaE DAME LAW. 157, 162-163 (1949) ; McGovney, Racial Resldential Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants
or Conditions in Deeds is Unconstitutional, 33 CAmIF. L. Ray. 5, 11 (1945).
5. It is said that the trend of the cases since Shelley v. Kraemer has been to regard that decision as proscribing any judicial action giving effect to racial restrictive
covenants. See 18 Gao. WAsH. L. Ra-v. 417, 420 (1950).
But most of the cases
have involved enforcement in the sense of granting specific performance in one
form or another. E.g., Coleman v. Stewart, 33 Cal.2d 703, 204 P.2d 7 (1949)
(no injunction against occupancy); Tovey v. Levy, 401 Ill. 393, 82 N.E.2d 441
(1948) (no restraint of breach). Cf. Clifton v. Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1948) (state court can't deny judgment of title to Mexican in cross-action).
6. For a description and evaluation of devices proposed or operating, see 37
CALrF. L. Ray. 493 (1949); Scanlan, supra note 4, at 183-189; Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Aimendnent: The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16
U. OF CHl. L. Rav. 203, 216-224 (1949).
7. The question was discussed in many of the comments on Shelley v. Kraemer.
The consensus was that such action was precluded. See 61 HARV. L. RIv. 1450, 1451
(1948) ; Scanlan, supra note 4, at 182; Crooks, The Racial Covenaant Cases, 37 Gao.
LJ. 514, 524 (1949); 37 CALIF. L. REV. 493, n. 5 (1949); 18 Gao. WASr. L. REv.
417, 420-421 (1950); 3 A.L.R.2d 473 (1949).
Judge Edgerton, whose dissent in
Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.2d 233, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1947), appears to have served as a
basis for much of the Supreme Court's opinion in Shelley v. Kraemer, was of the
opinion that a holding forbidding enforcement of a racial covenant by injunction would
not necessarily preclude a damage action. Id. at 240 n.22.
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Leaon,8 held that an action for damages was not foreclosed by Shelley v.
Kraemer-that in banning court "enforcement" the Supreme Court had
referred only to specific performance. 9 Dictum of Chief Justice Vinson,
speaking for the Court in the Shelley case, to the effect that a racial covenant was itself not violative of constitutional rights,10 was seized upon as
basis for the conclusion that for breach of a "valid" agreement an action
for damages could be entertained. Two other courts have reached the
opposite result on the same question. In 1950 a federal district court
refused to entertain an action for damages, stating that the Shelley holding
means no "assistance by way of judicial action of any kind." " The
Michigan Supreme Court, in a March 1952 decision, held that the reasons
on which the Shelley decision was based operate in bar of an indirect
method of enforcement such as an action for damages for breach of
covenant.' 2
In the instant case the entire transaction was apparently based on the
assumption that an action for damages would be upheld in Oklahoma.
Plaintiff alleged that an insolvent mesne grantee was used as a device to
"cheat and deprive plaintiff of his right to pursue a solvent seller on his
claim of damages for breach of contract." 's The trial court sustained
defendants' demurrers in a ruling which made clear the judge's view that
Shelley v. Kraemer precluded any action based on a restrictive covenant. 14
The appellate court, in reversing, held that the petition stated a proper cause
of action in tort for conspiracy to injure plaintiff by breaching the covenant
and preventing him from obtaining damages against the seller. It expressed the view that in Shelley v. Kraemer the Supreme Court had held
restrictive covenants valid, that therefore an action for damages for breach
would lie. On this basis the court held that persons who conspire to
breach the covenant and, by using an insolvent mesne grantee, prevent a
party to the covenant from recovering damages, all with intent to injure
the covenantee, are liable in damages. In an apparent effort completely to
preclude difficulties from a possible broad interpretation of Shelley v.
8. 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S.W.2d 127 (1949) ; 98 U. OF PA. L. RV. 588 (1950).
9. Acording to most authorities the word "enforcement" is "not properly so
narrowly defined." 18 GEo. WAsH. L. R.v. 417, 418 (1950), and authorities cited.
10. 334 U.S. at 13; termed "the most seriously disappointing aspect" of the case
by Professor Frank, who felt that it was "wholly unnecessary to reaffirm the Civil
Rights cases ;" see Frank, The United States Supremte Court: 1947-48, 16 U. OF Ci.

L. REv. 1, 24 (1948).
11. Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F. Supp. 604 (D.C. 1950). Since the case arose in the
District of Columbia, the holding actually was based on Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24
(1948), argued and decided by the Supreme Court together with Shelley v. Kraemer.
The decision in the Hurd case was based on the Federal Civil Rights Act, REv. STAT.
§ 1978, and alternatively on the ground that it is against United States public policy
to permit District of Columbia courts to do that which the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits to the state courts.
12. Phillips v. Naff, 52 N.W.2d 158 (Mich. 1952).
13. 237 P.2d at 1022.
14. Initially defendants' general demurrer had been overruled. After the Shelley
decision was announced the trial judge reversed himself and sustained the demurrer,
from which action the appeal was taken. See 237 P.2d at 1021.

1052

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

Kraemer, the court asserted that "All acts done in carrying out the conspiracy were extraneous to the mere sale of property to Negro purchasers,
and extraneous to the performance or non-performance of the restrictive
contract." 15 However this may be, it is apparent that the validity of the
decision turns on the scope of Shelley v. Kraemer. If that case does not
admit of an action for damages for breach of a restrictive covenant, plaintiff here has not been injured by the device employed. If the Shelley case
does not recognize the "enforceability" in any form of the covenant, a state
court presumably may not grant any relief predicated on the "validity"
of such covenant. Thus, in spite of the fact that the action was in tort,
complete with allegations of willful and malicious intent to injure, the
instant case is actually little further removed from Shelley v. Kraemer than
was the Weiss case, where the Missouri court allowed damages for breach
of a restrictive covenant.

In Weiss v. Leaon,16 as in the instant case, dictum in the Shelley
opinion 17 was taken as a pronouncement of "validity" upon restrictive
covenants and was used as a basic premise in the reasoning that if a contract is valid an action for its breach must lie, even though "enforcement"
is precluded.'
What the Shelley opinion actually said was that, as inter15. 237 P.2d at 1022-23.

Neither the allegations in the petition nor the court's

analysis of the conspiracy elsewhere in the opinion support this statement.
It is established as a general proposition that in certain circumstances where a
combination acts for the purpose of injuring another and injury results, an action for
damages may lie against the conspirators even though the same acts done with the
same purpose by an individual would not be actionable. Stearns Lumber Co. v.
Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 157 N.E. 82 (1927) ; Hawarden v. Youghiogheny Coal Co..
111 Wis. 545, 87 N.W. 472 (1901).
See 30 GEo. L.J. 319 (1942); Note, 4
Baoo.LxYN L. REv. 448 (1935); McKay, The Effect of Motive on the Lafuld
Character of Acts in Conspiracy Cases, PA. B.A.Q. No. 27, p. 371, 372 (1936);
Conspiracy to Injure, 193 L.T. 26 (1942).
Such cases seem to involve either an
element of fraud, usually with a false promise made and action in reliance upon
it by the promisee to his detriment, or the inducement of a breach of contract.
For examples of the fraud situation see Clark v. Sloan, 169 Okla. 347, 37 P.2d
263 (1934) ; Starmer v. Mid-West Chevrolet Co., 175 Okla. 160, 51 P.2d 786 (1935).
Inducing breach of contract primarily arises in labor disputes; see, e.g., Hitchman
Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917); PRossma, ToRTs 990 (1941).
Neither of these situations was alleged or present, apparently, in the instant case.
The court's version of the gist of the conspiracy here can only be gathered from the
single case cited in this connection, Rich v. N.Y.C. & H.R.R., 87 N.Y. 382 (1882).
This citation was to the effect that a tort action may arise from the breach of a
contract where "extraneous circumstances and conditions in connection with it may
establish such a relation as to make its performance a legal duty." As no such abnormal legal duty appears to exist in connection with the covenant here, particularly
in view of the Supreme Court's denial of its enforceability, the theory does not seem
sound. Other cases which have relied on the New York case cited have involved
an extraneous duty clearly imposed either by statute, e.g., Cortes v. Baltimore
Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367 (1932), or by established case law, e.g., Greco v. Kresge
Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938) (duty of a supplier of food). Prosser
states that "If a relation exists which would give rise to a legal duty without enforcing the contract promise itself, the tort action will lie, otherwise not." PRossER,
TORTS 205 (1941).
16. Supra note 8. The case was adversely criticised by virtually all writers who
considered it. See, e.g., 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 588 (1950); 6 LoYOLA L. REv. 52
(1951); 63 HAR. L. Ry. 1062 (1950); 18 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 417 (1950);
30 GEo. L.J. 678 (1950).
17. See note 10 subra.
18. 359 Mo. at 1061, 225 S.W.2d at 131 (1949).
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preted by the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the Fourteenth Amendment
"ierects no shield against merely private conduct," and that therefore "the
restrictive agreements standing alone" do not violate rights guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 The Court then stated that there is no
state action nor violation of the Amendment "so long as the purposes of
those agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms." 20
Thus the covenant would appear to be "valid" only in the sense that an
oral contract which has not satisfied the statute of frauds is valid-it can
be ended at will without court "enforcement" of any kind resulting, including an action for damages for breach.21 As to the intended meaning of
enforcement, "awarding damages is no less judicial enforcement because
it is on the legal docket rather than on the equity docket." 22 But even
if the narrow meaning of "enforcement" is correct, the effect of allowing
an action for damages is to permit the power of the court to be used to
discriminate, only less directly. Property owners will either be deterred
from conveying to the excluded class, or will require the buyer to pay
enough for the property to cover a future action for damages. 23 Either
amounts to unequal treatment. In the Shelley case Chief justice Vinson
stated that, "The difference between judicial enforcement and non-enforcement of the restrictive covenants is the difference to petitioners between
being denied rights of property available to other members of the community and being accorded full enjoyment of those rights on an equal
footing." 24 These words seem as applicable to an action for damages as
discriminatory result in the
to an action for specific performance. The 25
former, though less direct, is no less effective.
19. 334 U.S. at.13 (italics added).
20. Ibid. (italics added). As one writer notes, the court did not say the

covenants were valid-it only refrained from holding them invalid, leaving the inaking of such contracts legal if a state wishes to so rule; but to the extent that
"validity" implies enforceability, the Court says they are invalid. 18 GEo. WAsH.
L. REv. 417, 419 (1950).
21. See 38 GEo. L.J. 678, 680 (1950).
22. 6 LoYor.A L. Rnv. 52, 55 (1951).
23. See 38 GEo. L.J. 678, 680 (1950); 6 LoYoLA L. REv. 52, 56 (1951).
24. 334 U.S. at 19.
25. A possible hurdle, not considered in the cases thus far, is whether the white
seller may raise the constitutional objection once his property has been conveyed.
Language that these rights are "personal" might create a problem. See Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (applied in a different context); McCabe v. A.T. &
S.F.R. Co., 235 U.S. 141, 161-162 (1914); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U.S. 337, 351 (1938). In each of the cases cited by the Court in Shelley v. Kraemer
as examples of judicial action amounting to state action, the right to constitutional
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment was raised by the person protected.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) ;
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); A.F. of L. v. Swing,. 312 U.S. 321
In Buchanan v.
(1941); Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), the white seller succeeded in challenging the state
action (an ordinance), but he was being deprived of the right to convey. One writer
suggests several possible answers to this problem, including that if the holding in
Shelley v. Kraemer was intended to be as broad as is generally believed, the Court
would not find it necessary to consider the question of who can raise the constitutional
defense. 6 LoYoLA L. Ray. 52, 57-58 (1951).
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Until the Supreme Court rules specifically on the right of the state
courts to entertain damage suits for breach of racial covenants, the scope
of Shelley v. Kraemer must remain a matter of conjecture326 Variations
of the problem will no doubt arise in conspiracy and other forms of tort
action so long as the state courts are permitted to consider the covenants
"valid" and to enter judgments based on their validity.27 But in Shelley v.
Kraemer the Court took a major step forward.28 It is not likely that it will
hesitate to take a relatively minor additional step to prevent the state
courts from effecting discrimination indirectly instead of directly2

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-HABEAS CORPUS-SECTION 2255 OF THE
JUDICIAL CODE EMPOWERS FEDERAL COURTs TO REUIRE PRESENCE OF
PRISONER AT HEARING-Prisoner, convicted by the federal district court
for California of forging government checks, 1 was confined at McNeil
Island, Washington, when he moved the sentencing court to vacate the
sentence and grant a new trial under § 2255 of the Judicial Code,2 alleging
26. No attempt was made to obtain Supreme Court review of either this case
or the Weiss case. One can only speculate as to the reason. It has been pointed out
that restrictive covenants are actually only a "fourth line of defense for entrenched
prejudice"--that first the Negro buyer must survive the real estate dealers' "code of
ethics," the problem of obtaining a mortgage loan, and the community pressure on
the white seller. Hence few restrictive covenant cases reach the courts, for the
Negro seldom gets past the first three barriers. Frank, supra note 10, at 25-26. See
Ming, supra note 6, at 224-228.
27. For example, there is no apparent reason why an action might not be brought
against the Negro buyer alone for "inducing a breach of contract." Or "conspiracy
to induce a breach of contract" would seem to be a more likely method of avoiding
problems under Shelley v. Kraemer than the action brought in the instant case, since
no enforceable contract is required to maintain that action. See PRossER, ToaTs 980
et seq. (1941).
28. In prior cases where judicial action had been held to be state action the objectionable element had been the courts' application of case law; in the restrictive
covenant cases the objectionable element was created by the contracts of private
persons, with the courts merely enforcing. See 61 HARv. L. REv. 1450, 1451 (1948)
Scanlan, supra note 4, at 171.
29. One of the few writers who attacked the Shelley decision surveyed the Court's
reversals of precedent and said "One thing clearly is evident; the Court will protect
civil rights with a uniformity and constancy not found in other fields." Crooks,
The Racial Covenant Cases, 37 GEo. L.J. 514 (1949).
1. The conviction was affirmed,, 163 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1947).
2. "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court
was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess
of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
"A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
"Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that
the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall . . . grant a prompt hearing
thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with
respect thereto. If the court finds the judgment [defective] . . . the court shall
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denial of effective assistance of counsel at his trial.3 Without ordering the
production of the prisoner, the district court heard testimony and dismissed the motion. On appeal the circuit court reversed, allowing the
prisoner to attack his conviction by writ of habeas corpus. 4 The court held
that when the Constitution requires the presence of the prisoner at the
hearing because of the factual issue involved, 5 and when the prisoner is not
within the jurisdiction of the court, § 2255 is necessarily inadequate to test
the validity of his detention since the section does not authorize the court
to compel the prisoner's presence; 6 further that if the section precludes
resort to habeas corpus in this situation, it is unconstitutional. 7 This decision was vacated by the Supreme Court by a unanimous holding that
§ 2255 empowers the court to compel the presence of the prisoner.8 United

States v. Hayman, 72 Sup. Ct. 263 (1952).
The decision in both the circuit court and the Supreme Court depended
upon the meaning of the statutory language, "A court may entertain and
determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner."
On its face the section authorizes only an ex parte hearing, which would
raise the issue of whether such a procedure is constitutional. But the
Supreme Court, to avoid that issue while still giving partial effect to the
intent of § 2255, held that the permissive language by implication negatived
any purpose to deny power to procure the prisoner in any ease where his
presence was constitutionally required.
vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him
or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.
"A court nay entertain and determine such otion without requiring the production of the prisonerat the hearing.
"The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive
motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
"An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order as from a final
judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.
"An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained
it it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court
which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears
that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. 1951) (emphasis added).
3. The prisoner alleged that his defense counsel also represented the prosecution's principal witness against him, and that he had no knowledge of this dual representation.
4. United States v. Iayman, 187 F.2d 456 (9th Cir.), 64 HAv.L. R.Ev. 856, 37
VA. L. REv. 1001 (1951).
5. On the rehearing in the circuit court, and again in the Supreme Court, the
government conceded that the factual issue required the presence of the prisoner,
Brief for Petitioner [United States], p. 8, and that the district court erred in conducting the ex parte proceedings, id., p. 11.
6. The circuit court, one judge dissenting, read § 2255 to authorize an ex parte
hearing, so that the case came within the exemption clause of the section, and if it
were not within the exemption, then the section was unconstitutional. See the language of the section set forth in note 2 supra.
7. "The privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S.
CoNsr. Art. I., § 9.
8. Chief Justice Vinson delivered the opinion of the Court. Black and Douglas,
J., concurred only in the result, and Minton, J., did not participate.
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As early as 1943 the Judicial Conference 9 recognized the abuses which
attended the expansion of the writ of habeas corpus as a method of collaterally attacking the legality of a conviction. 10 The number of petitions
in the federal courts was increasing," and the increase in volume accentuated the abuses. Habeas corpus must be brought in the district of confinement, 12 and where substantial factual issues are involved the prisoner
must be present at the hearing.'3 In this situation a prisoner who fabricated
a story sufficient to establish a prima facie case forced the court to determine the merit of his claim although the records and data of his conviction
were not readily accessible so that the court had little basis for determining
whether his claim was frivolous.' 4 This required the court in the district
of confinement to pass upon extra-record facts surrounding the conviction,
which facts were best known to the sentencing court,' 5 and placed a
disproportionate burden of handling petitions upon courts near large federal prisons.'8 It was apparent that this particular abuse would be par9. The Judicial Conference, established by Congress in 1922, is composed of
the chief judges of the circuit courts and the Chief Justice of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 331 (Supp. 1951). Its function is the making of a comprehensive survey
of judicial administration, and the submission to Congress of its proposals.
10. For a discussion of the origins and development of the writ of habeas corpus
see 9 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 108-125 (1926); Jenks, The Story
of The Habeas Corpus, 18 L.Q. REv. 64 (1902); Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus: A
Protean Writ and Remedy, 8 F.R.D. 179 (1949) ; Parker, Limiting the Abuse of
Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1949). The expansion of the writ to cover facts
outside the record is discussed in Holtzoff, Collateral Review of Convictions in
Federal Courts, 25 B.U.L. REv. 26 (1945); Note, 61 HARv. L. Rmv. 657 (1948).
11. In 1941 there were 598 applications for habeas corpus filed in the federal
courts. The figure in 1944 was 1204, and in 1949, 1391. However these figures include three types of petitions, deportation, federal prisoners and cases involving state
prisoners. Petitions involving federal prisoners comprise about one half of all applications: in 1941, 318; 1942, 350; 1943, 475; 1944, 524; 1945, 475. REPORT OF JuDICIAL CONFERENCE 111 (1950).
Section 2255 applies only to federal prisoners, see
note 2 supra.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 224 1(a) (Supp. 1951). See Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188
(1947).
13. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
14. It is apparent that the sentencing court could readily dismiss claims which
were obviously without merit since it would have a better knowledge of what actually
occurred at the trial. However, what would be patently frivolous to the sentencing
court could easily seem valid to a court far removed from the records of the trial.
15. See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob domination of trial);
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942) (coerced plea of guilty) ; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (use of perjured testimony by prosecution); House v.
Mayo, 324 U.S. 43 (1945) (denial of right to consult counsel).
16. For example, in the fiscal year 1947-1948 there were 1346 applications for
habeas corpus filed in the federal district courts. This figure represented 1.7% of
all cases pending in the district courts. But the proportion of habeas corpus petitions to the total number of cases handled by some courts near federal prisons was
startling; e.g., Kansas (Leavenworth), 65.2%o; Northern Georgia (Atlanta), 26.4%;
Middle District of Pennsylvania (Lewisburg), 25.4%; and Western Washington
(McNeil Island), 14.5%. Speck, Statistics on Federal Habeas Corpus, 10 OHIO
ST. L.J. 337, 350 (1949). However, the passage of §2255 has not materially decreased the number of applications by federal prisoners. In 1948, before enactment
of the section, there were 506 applications; in 1949 the figure was 481, and in 1950,
409. In 1949 there were 102 motions under § 2255, and in 1950, 112.
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tially remedied if the prisoner were required to bring his petition in the
sentencing court, and the secondary effect would be the equalization of the
number of petitions handled by the federal courts. Thus, the Conference
submitted a bill to Congress which contained such a provision, and which
provided that the prisoner should be produced in cases where the Constitution would require his presence at habeas corpus hearings.' 7 Since the
entire code was then under revision, the proposal was not enacted at that
time, but it emerged in modified form as § 2255 when the Judicial Code
was adopted in 1948.18 Whereas the Conference version did nothing but
change the venue of the traditional habeas corpus proceeding from the district of confinement to that of the sentencing court, the congressional version not only omitted the requirement that the prisoner be produced, but
specifically provided that the motion could be entertained without producing
the prisoner. The reviser's note declared that the section was in the nature
of the ancient writ of error coram nobis, 19 which writ did not require the
presence of the prisoner. 20 Judge Parker of the fourth circuit, who was
chairman of the Conference committee which drafted the forerunner of the
section, more than once maintained that § 2255 requires only an ex parte
hearing.21 Although other courts have upheld the constitutionality of the
section, those decisions held only that § 2255 suspends the use of habeas
corpus where the prisoner cannot show that his remedy thereunder is
22
"inadequate" or "ineffective" to test the validity of a conviction.
17. The Conference submitted two bills to Congress, the forerunners of § 2255.
Only the second of these is important here, H.R. 4233, S. 1451, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1945). This provided that the court would not entertain the motion "where it will
not be practicable to determine [the prisoner's] rights . . . becaue of his inability
to be present at the hearing on the motion, or for other reasons. . . ." The letter
of transmittal indicates that such a situation would occur where the danger of transporting the prisoner cross-country would outweigh the advantages of having the motion
arise in the sentencing court rather than the court in the district of confinement.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (Supp. 1951). The traditional habeas corpus procedure
remains intact in the code, § 2241 et seq.; however the last paragraph of § 2255, set
forth in note 2 supra, virtually suspends its use by federal prisoners. The decision
in Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950), limits use of the sections by state prisoners
by requiring the prisoner to exhaust his state remedies, including certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, before resorting to habeas corpus in the federal courts.
19. Section 2255 "restates, clarifies and simplifies the procedure in the nature
of the ancient writ of error coram nobis. It provides an expeditious remedy for correcting erroneous sentences without resort to habeas corpus. It has the approval of
the Judicial Conference of the United States ... " Reviser's Note to § 2255, 28
U.S.C. (Supp. 1951).
20. Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1183, 1187 (1950).
21. "The court before which the motion is made is authorized to entertain and
pass upon it without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing."
Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 175 (1949). In Barber
v. United States, 142 F.2d 805, 806 (4th Cir. 1944), the court likens the procedure
to an appeal of a conviction where the prisoner's presence would not be constitutionally
required, and in Crowe v. United States, 175 F.2d 799, 801 (4th Cir. 1949), judge
Parker declares the issue is whether the presence of the prisoner will "aid the court
in arriving at the truth of the matter involved." However, the 10th circuit has said
that the prisoner should be produced unless only a matter of law is involved, or the
motion discloses that the movant is entitled to no relief, Barrett v. Hunter, 180 F.2d
510, 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 897 (1950). The interpretation of the
tenth circuit was adopted by the Supreme Court in the instant case, at 274.
22. See, e.g., Smith v. Reid, 191 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir.*1951); Meyers v. Welch,
179 F.2d 707 (4th Cir. 1950); Weber v Steele, 185 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1950);
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In deciding the instant case, the Court faced three alternatives. A
holding that § 2255 was inadequate to test the conviction of a prisoner on
the facts of this case would frustrate the original purpose of the provision.
A holding that the section made an ex parte hearing adequate would raise
a constitutional problem of suspension of habeas corpus. 23 However, there
were three excellent reasons for so holding: the reviser's note said the motion was in the nature of coram nobis; the congressional version had discarded the requirement that the prisoner be present; and the language provided only for an ex parte hearing. These objections were brushed aside
by the court, which declared the section was merely in the rature of coram
nobis, and that the language of the section was not unsympathetic to the
position taken by the Conference. On the other hand, the Court recognized the conditions which prompted the Conference to propose the original
bill, and was informed that the plan was workable in practice.24 There
were advantages in holding that § 2255 authorized the court to compel the
presence of the prisoner. It avoided completely the constitutional issue
and accomplished what the Conference had attempted to do. Although
the language of the section is strained to support the holding, the Court
was willing to overlook the objections and imply a power to procure the
prisoner in order to save an undeniably meritorious plan from the con25
stitutional graveyard.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw-PRicE

REGULATION-SECTION

13(a)

OF

ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT HELD CONSTITUTIONAL-Plaintiff brought a civil
action for treble damages for injury allegedly caused by defendant's violation of a section of the Robinson-Patman Act which makes it a crime for
any person "to sell, or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low prices
Donnelly v. Steele, 180 F.2d 1019 (8th Cir. 1950). See also Martin v. Hiatt, 174
F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1949) (use of § 2255 as a condition precedent to habeas corpus
is not unreasonable).
23. Section 2255 raises another constitutional issue, not here involved, i.e.,
whether the language of the section which would permit a determination of a motion
thereunder to be final is an invalid denial of habeas corpus. See the fifth paragraph
of § 2255 set forth in note 2 supra.
24. It was contended by the government that a survey of United States attorneys
revealed that the procedure used by them was to request the court to order the production of the prisoner and that this result was accomplished with little or no difficulty
under the provisions of § 2255. Twenty cases were used to illustrate that this procedure had been utilized where the prisoner was not within the jurisdiction of the
court. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 187-197. The respondent, however, contended that
this was merely a "trickle" of cases which was not generally representative. Brief
for Respondent, pp. 19-20.
25. The Court also found additional justification in the language of the code
authorizing the courts to issue "all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a) (Supp. 1951). Instant case at 273.
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for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor." I
Defendant moved for dismissal of the action on the ground that the statute

was unconstitutionally vague. The court denied the motion, holding that
the statute provides a sufficiently definite warning of what conduct is made
criminal so that it complies with the due process requirements of the Fifth
Amendment, since the statute requires findings of both an unreasonably low
price and a specific intent to destroy competition thereby. F. & A. Ice
Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 98 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
Actions under this statute may be brought by the Department of
Justice or treble damage claimants. There have as yet been no criminal
actions, and no recoveries in treble damage actions.2 Comparatively few
civil actions have been brought under the statute, and until the instant case,
no court has passed on whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague.
There are no well-defined tests for determining whether a criminal statute
is unconstitutionally vague. It is frequently stated that a statute is bad if
"men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. . .. " 8 But this is subject to qualification.
The terms of a statute may have little meaning to the average man and
still be valid as applied to a group to which those terms have a particular
significance, 4 the meaning of which can be ascertained by a court through
the use of expert testimony. A statute is considered sufficiently definite
if its words have a well-settled common law meaning, 5 for then the courts
have the standards of precedent to guide them in reaching a decision. And
the intent required by the statute is highly relevant with regard to the need
of adequate advance notice, in order to save an otherwise too broad statute.
For example, in Gorin v. United States," the Supreme Court upheld a
statute which made it a crime to deliver information relating to national
defense to an agent of a foreign government "with intent or reason to
believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation." The Court implied that if the statute merely
prohibited delivery of information relating to national defense to a foreign
power, it might be too vague because it would force a person, "at his peril,
1. 49 STAT. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1946). The suit was brought under
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1946) which permits any person "injured by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" to institute an action for threefold damages.
That a suit for violation of the statute involved in the instant case is an action under
the antitrust laws was determined by this court in Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden
Farms Co., 94 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
2. See, e.g., Goodman & Sons, Inc. v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., 81 F. Supp.
890 (D. Mass. 1949) (recovery denied because of insufficient causal connection between unreasonably low prices and plaintiff's alleged injury.)
3. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). See, e.g.,
Winters v. State of New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948) ; United States v. Petrillo,
332 U.S. 1, 6 (1947) ; Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 454 (1939).
4. See, e.g., Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502 (1925)
(". .. the term 'kosher' has a meaning well enough defined to enable one engaged
in the trade to correctly apply it, at least as a general thing.").
5. See Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
6. 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
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to speculate as to whether certain actions violated the statute," 7 even
though the use of the words "national defense" in the statute had a well
understood connotation.8 The saving factor was the requirement that in
order to be guilty of its violation, a person must have acted in bad faith.9
Therefore, it would seem that even though an individual might not be able
to predetermine that his specific action was proscribed by a statute, this
would not matter if the required intent was one that was culpable by
ordinary standards. Thus, the determination of whether a particular
criminal statute meets the constitutional requirements of definiteness would
seem to depend largely upon how well the definition of the acts proscribed
serves the two-fold function of providing the individual with adequate
notice of what conduct is made criminal, and of providing the courts
with sufficient standards to guide them in their application of the law in
a fair and consistent manner. 10
The cause of action in the instant case is a civil one, but since it can
be successfully maintained only by a showing of a violation of a criminal
statute, the adequacy of the statute must be judged in terms of the degree
of definiteness required in criminal statutes-adequate notice and an ascertainable standard by which to determine what constitutes a violation of
its terms. In United States v. Cohen Grocery Co.," a statute which made
it a criminal offense "wilfully . . . to make any unjust or unreasonable
rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries" was held
void by the Supreme Court for failure to set forth an ascertainable standard
of guilt. This case was the foundation for the later decision of Cline v.
Fink Dairy Co., 12 which involved a statute making criminal any conspiracy to restrain trade, increase or reduce prices, or prevent competition.
The Court indicated that such language was sufficiently definite for
purposes of a criminal statute, but held the statute unconstitutional because
of a proviso which stated that "no agreement or association shall be deemed
to be unlawful or within the provisions of this act, the object and purposes
of which are to conduct operations at a reasonable profit or to market at a
reasonable profit those products which cannot otherwise be so marketed."
The Court's objection was that the statute in effect made the difference
between legal and illegal conduct depend on the uncertain test of whether
prices are reasonable, stating that there is no justification for "holding the
average member of society in advance to a rule of conduct measured by his
judgment and action in respect to what is a reasonable price or a reasonable
7. Id. at 26.
8. Id. at 28.
9. Ibid.
10. See Note, 62 HARv. L. Rav. 77 (1948). See, e.g., United States v. Petrillo,
332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947) ("We think that the language Congress used provides an adequate warning as to what conduct falls under its ban, and marks boundaries

sufficiently distinct for judges and juries fairly to administer the law in accordance
with the will of Congess.").
11. 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
12. 274 U.S. 445 (1927).
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profit." 13 Yet the statute in the instant case has essentially the same effect.
There can be little doubt that the required intent to destroy competition is
by itself as sufficiently definite as the intent stated in the statute considered
in the Cline case. But both statutes make the illegality of that intent depend
on whether or not a price is reasonable, for no matter how culpable an
individual's intent may be, he cannot be convicted unless he sought to
achieve his purpose by means of unreasonable prices. Therefore, the essential test of the present statute's definiteness is basically one of whether it
is possible for a court and jury to determine, as a matter of fact, when a
price is reasonable or unreasonable. It is submitted that, as suggested by
the Court in the Cline case, there exist no adequate standards for such a
determination.
The court, in the instant case, suggests that whether a price is unreasonably low is a fact that can be determined "by ordinary business and
accountancy methods which take into consideration cost, market, usual
profits and other elements." 14 In the first place, cost accountancy is far
from possessing the "exactness of a science" 15 visualized by the court.
There are so many variable factors that go into a computation of the cost
of producing and selling a specified article that it is impossible to state such
cost with exactness. For example, there are three principal methods of
pricing material used in production of an article-the first-in-first-out
method, the average cost method, and the last-in-first-out method-each
of which will give a different unit cost of that article in any given accounting period. Yet what method is used is largely a matter of business
policy. Similarly, the apportionment, between products, of general expenses such as executive salaries or depreciation of fixed assets can be at
best only a calculated guess; even the amount of depreciation to be allocated
will vary with the estimate as to the probable useful life of each class of
fixed assets. Assuming, however, that a seller's costs for a given article
could be ascertained with exactness, a jury might be able to decide whether
the seller's price was unreasonably low as related to his costs. But the
same price might be found reasonable as compared with the costs of competitors, or reasonable in light of evidence that the available supply of the
article far exceeded demand. Each additional criterion presented to the
jury as bearing on what is an unreasonably low price would tend to influence and possibly alter its finding. The result is that, in each case, the
decision as to whether a price is unreasonably low will depend largely
on the choice of factors by which it is evaluated. But a purported "standard" which is made up of any number of combinations of elements of
evaluation is so completely inconsistent with any degree of definiteness
that, as a practical matter, it furnishes no standard whatsoever.
The decision in the instant case is likely to have unfortunate results
for it opens the way to a large amount of harassing litigation. Sellers are
13. Id. at 464.
14. Instant case at 189.

15. Ibid.
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placed in the awkward position of never knowing whether their prices
will be considered unreasonable. Even though a seller may have no intent
to "destroy" competition, his competitors can still bring him into court and
force him to divulge his cost figures every time he drops his prices below
current market figures. The requirement of a specific intent to "destroy"
competition does not lessen this danger, for since practically every attempt
to obtain more business indicates an intent to take business from competitors, the only way a culpable intent can be proved is by the use of the
same means as used to establish unreasonable prices. The effect of such
a sanction on "unreasonably low" prices is to defeat recognized advantages
of a competitive system-the achievement of lower prices and elimination
of the inefficient producer. Since the overall purpose of the antitrust laws
is essentially to benefit the consumer by encouraging competition and
resultant lower prices, this would seem to be an area where it is especially
wise to have a precise definition of what conduct is proscribed by a criminal
statute. It is not desirable, for example, to encourage the transmission of
any information to a foreign country for the purpose of injuring the United
States, so the need for exact description of the type of information which
the treason statute in the Gorin case 16 declares shall not be so transmitted
is not very great. Certainly there is far more need for exact description
of what prices are made criminal by a statute such as that in the instant
case, especially since its violation is held to give rise to a civil action by a
competitor, since lower prices generally are to be encouraged. Yet it is the
very lack of preciseness in the statute here upheld which may make businessmen loath to lower their prices for fear of being sued by competitors
so that the result may well be actual discouragement of desirable competition at the expense of consumers.

FAMILY LAw-ATTACHMENT OF "SPENDTHRIFT"

NUITY

BENEFITS TO

RETIREMENT AN-

REcOVER ALImONY-Plaintiff obtained a judgment

for arrearages in alimony due under her California divorce, and sought
to garnish her ex-husband's retirement annuity payments. The group insurance contract between the defendant's former employer and the New
Jersey garnishee insurance company provided that the annuity payments
"are non-assignable whether by voluntary action or by operation of law."
Held, that this provision was valid and that payments to the non-resident
defendant could not be attached to meet a foreign judgment for accrued
alimony. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 84 A.2d 441 (N.J. 1951).
If no jurisdictional problems were involved, and ex-wife and exhusband were residents of the state in which the divorce had been granted,
plaintiff could reach such pension payments without the necessity of trying
to attach the funds while they were still in the hands of the garnishee.
A state gives equitable enforcement to its own alimony decrees, and there
have been numerous decisions that pension money, although made exempt
16. See note 6 supra.
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by statute from all legal process, nonetheless may be obtained by the ex-wife
through the simple expedient of making the ex-husband liable for contempt
if he fails to pay alimony out of his pension receipts.' But if the ex-husband
moves to another state, the full faith and credit clause requires no more than
that the first state's judgment for irrevocable and unalterable accrued alimony be honered as a debt of record by the foreign jurisdiction. 2 Thus
most states regard the ex-wife in this situation no differently than any
judgment creditor, and deny her the special remedies available to her when
the ex-husband has stayed in the state which granted the divorce. s This
rule has been vigorously criticized,4 and some jurisdictions as a matter of
comity will give the same equitable remedies regardless of whether or not
the divorce was obtained within that jurisdiction.5
Even without equitable remedies, the wife would be able to reach these
payments if this retirement annuity contract was regarded as a straight
spendthrift trust, which it so closely resembles. The Restatement 7 and a
number of jurisdictions, probably including New Jersey,8 will pierce a
spendthrift trust for the benefit of certain classes of claimants, including
wives seeling alimony. 9 Moreover, where a person creates a spendthrift
trust of which he is a beneficiary, the spendthrift provision is almost universally held invalid.' 0 The employee in a retirement benefit insurance
program furnishes at least part of the consideration for the contract of
which he is ultimately the beneficiary," and if spendthrift trust principles
1. Ex parte Smallbone, 16 Cal.2d 532, 106 P.2d 873 (1940) ; Zwingman v. Zwingman, 134 N.Y. Supp. 1077, 150 App. Div. 358 (1912) ; Tully v. Tully, 159 Mass. 91,
34 N.E. 79 (1893) ; Pugh v. St. Louis Police Relief Ass'n, 237 Mo. App. 922, 179
S.W.2d 927 (1944) ; Hannah v. Hannah, 191 Ga. 134, 11 S.E.2d 779 (1940) ; Com.

v. Berfield, 160 Pa. Super. 438, 51 A.2d 523 (1947); Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112

F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1940). The case last cited has an extensive discussion of the
authorities.
2. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910).
3. This is the rule in New Jersey. Bennett v. Bennett, 63 N.J. Eq. 306, 49 Ad.
501 (1901).
4. E.g., Jacobs, The Enforcenent of Foreign Decrees for Alimony, 6 LAW &
C.P. 250, 265-273 (1939).
5. Palen v. Palen, 12 Cal. App.2d 357, 55 P.2d 228 (1936); Cousineau v.
Cousineau, 155 Ore. 184, 63 P.2d 897 (1936) ; Shibley v. Shibley, 181 Wash. 166, 42
P.2d 446 (1935); Ostrander v. Ostrander, 190 Minn. 547, 252 N.W. 449 (1934).
New York accomplishes a somewhat analogous result by statute. N.Y. CIv. PR. c.
Acr §§ 1171-1172.
6. See Gaiswow, SPENrDHRrFT TRusTs § 114.1 (2d ed. 1947).
7. IESTATEmENT, TRusTs § 157 (1935).
8. Wright v. Leupp, 70 N.J. Eq. 130, 62 AtI. 464 (1905) (wife or children of
beneficiary of spendthrift trust may enforce obligation to support them from trust
interest); Marsh v. Scott, 2 N.J. Super. 240, 63 A.2d 275 (1949) (income from
spendthrift trust can be reached for support of minor child). See also N.J. STAT.
ANr. §2:26-182 (1939), Harcum v. Greene, 111 N.J.L. 129, 166 At. 717 (1933).
9. 1 ScoTt, TRusTs §157.1 (1939); GRiswoLD, SraEtr'mirr TRUSTS §339 (2d
ed. 1947).
10. 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 156.
11. The details of the insurance contract in the instant case are not given; usually
employee and employer both contribute. Even if the employer made the entire contribution, that was part of the consideration for which the employee gave his services,
and the employer is in no sense a donor.
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were to be applied, he would be regarded as the settlor 2 and any creditor
could reach his interest.
New Jersey has held that anti-alienation provisions through the
medium of a life insurance contract are valid because of the close analogy
to spendthrift trusts.13 But in the instant case the court declined to follow
the spendthrift trust analogy, which would permit the anti-alienation provision to be pierced for alimony, because "public policy should protect from
dissipation reasonable pension funds created for the protection of low or
medium salaried industrial employees in their old age." ' That policy
has the obvious merit of protecting the pensioner from being made a public
charge because of his old debts, and by avoiding attachment litigation it
makes sure that he gets his money regularly and on time. But its application in the instant case, treating alimony as an ordinary debt, ignores the
fact that exemption from the claims of creditors is designed as much to
shield the pensioner's dependents as the pensioner himself, and makes it
possible for him to provide for those he -is obligated to support. 15 The
net effect of safeguarding the defendant's pension from alienation in the
instant case may be to throw his wife onto her home jurisdiction's relief
rolls. This situation is one where neither party's interests should be considered apart from the other's. The ex-wife should not be precluded from
reaching her ex-husband's interest, but neither should she be permitted to
take it all. Where two people are dependent upon so modest a pension,' 6
the interests of both must be considered and the pension divided in such
a way "as shall be just under the circumstances." 17 Such an adjustment is
most easily made in those jurisdictions which treat another state's alimony
decree as their own for equitable enforcement and modification. Where
the courts have not adopted so sensible a rule, treating the pension as a
spendthrift trust and adopting the "middle view" advocated by Professor
Scott which allows the ex-wife to reach so much of the beneficiary's interest
as is reasonable under the circumstances, is the next best solution.' 8 The
result in the instant case, which ignores the strong public policy behind
enforcement of alimony "up to the hilt," 19 strengthens a rule which encourages ex-husbands to avoid their family obligations by seeking haven in
jurisdictions which relegate dependents seeking support to the status of
ordinary judgment creditors.
12. A person who furnishes consideration for the creation of a trust is the settlor,
even though in form the trust is created by another person. 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 156.3.
13. Chelsea-Wheeler Coal Co. v. Marvin, 134 N.J. Eq. 432, 35 A.2d 874 (1944).
14. Seventy First Street & Broadway Corp. v. Thorne, 10 N.J. Misc. 99, 105,
157 Atl. 851, 854 (Sup. Ct. 1932), cited in instant case at 443. The court cites
exemptions in numerous public pension funds as illustrative of this public policy.
15. For the view that statutory exemptions of pension funds was not intended
to deprive dependents of the right to support from the husband, see Zwingman v.
Zwingman, 134 N.Y. Supp. 1077, 150 App. Div. 358 (1912) ; Schlaefer v. Schlaefer,
112 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1940)
16. The pension in the instant case was $138.84 a month, and the alimony judgment was for $100 a month.
17. GRIswoLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, model statute § 2(c) at 648 (2d ed. 1947).
18. 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 157.1.
19. Jacobs, supra note 4, at 272.

19521

RECENT CASES

FEDERAL JURISDICTION-JURISPRUDENcE-EFFECT OF ERIE V. TomPKINS ON A FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGE'S DECISIO-A citizen of

New York, a policyholder of a mutual insurance company organized under

the laws of Massachusetts, brought a derivative action on behalf of all the
policyholders against a majority of the directors of the corporation in a federal district court of Massachusetts. Federal jurisdiction was founded
solely upon diversity of citizenship. The complaint alleged that the defendant directors had made an improper loan to an insolvent corporation,
and asked that the directors be compelled to pay over to the company the
unpaid balance of the loan. No demand was made upon the directors or
fellow policyholders to bring the action. The court dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the failure to make demand would probably have
been fatal in a Massachusetts state court, and the federal court is constrained to act accordingly. Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341 (1951).
As a result of Erie v. Tompkins,' in cases where federal jurisdiction
attaches because of diversity of citizenship,2 federal judges are bound by
decisions of state courts in applying state law.3 The federal courts, because
of the desire for uniform decisions in matters of state law, have in effect the
same status as any lower state court,4 except that their decisions are not
subject to review by any state appellate court. When state law is uncertain
or difficult to ascertain, the federal courts may not decline to exercise
jurisdiction, 5 but must make their own independent formulations of the
applicable law. 6 But because of the desire for uniformity underlying the
Erie rule, some federal judges have believed it to be their primary duty,
when state law is unclear, to attempt to divine what the highest state court
would do if the controversy were before it.7
The Massachusetts rule with respect to a derivative suit against directors of a corporation is that a demand on the board of directors or on
the members of the corporation to bring action is a condition precedent
to the maintenance of the suit. A minority shareholder may institute the
suit himself only when making demand would be an "idle ceremony"
or when there is adequate reason to the contrary.8 The instant complaint
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. 62 STAT. 930 (1948) ; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1949).
3. E.g., Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlop, 308 U.S. 208 (1939); McClare v.
Moulton, 123 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1941). The federal courts are also bound by the
decisions of state inferior tribunals. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940) ;
see Broh-Kaln, Uniformity Run Riot-Exteion of the Erie Case, 31 Ky. L.J. 99
(1943).
4. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111-112 (1945).
5. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
6. E.g., MacGregor v. State Life Assurance Co., 119 F.2d 148 (6th Cir. 1941),
aff'd, 315 U.S. 280 (1942).
7. See Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir. 1945):
"We think this case is in that zone in which federal courts must do their best to
guess what the highest state court will do." See also instant case at 345: "His
task is to divine the views of the state court judges."
8. Brewer v. Proprietors of Boston Theatre, 104 Mass. 378 (1870) (demand not
necessary when alleged wrongdoing directors controlled directorate and owned majority of stock); Van Arnim v. American Tube Works, 188 Mass. 515, 74 N.E.
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alleged that a demand on the directors would be futile inasmuch as the
defendant directors constituted a majority of the directorate, that a demand
on the members would require a proxy fight with the management, and
that since there are several million policyholders living in all parts of the
world, the expense of communicating with them would be prohibitive.
Without deciding the question of failure to make demand on the remaining
directors, Judge Wyzanski ruled that the plaintiff's failure to make demand
on his fellow policyholders was fatal. All of the Massachusetts cases requiring demand have dealt with ordinary business corporations whose
members were shareholders. The court felt that the instant case was clearly
distinguishable from them. From a practical standpoint, a meeting of
members of a large insurance company is not analogous in independence or
width of representation to a meeting of shareholders of even a large corporation. 9 As a result, the judge clearly indicated that, in his opinion, the
justice and equity of the situation demanded an exception to the ordinary
Massachusetts rule requiring demand upon the members. Nevertheless,
because his best guess was that the Supreme Judicial Court of the state,
in light of its general hostility towards minority members' derivative suits,
would refuse to make an exception even in these circumstances, he felt
bound to dismiss the complaint.
The instant case points up what has been termed the "most troublesome" aspect 10 of Erie v. Tompkins: the restrictions placed upon the
judicial function of a federal judge in deciding a case where there are no
clearly controlling state decisions. While the Erie rule has had the undoubted beneficial effect of leading to greater uniformity in state decisions,
it has been at the sacrifice of what Justice Cardozo called the "Nature of
the Judicial Process." 11 To compel a federal judge's decision to be only
a "guess" as to what a state court would do in a situation with which it
has never been confronted places serious limitations upon his judicial r6le.
It is not only an unsatisfying r6le, but there is no certainty that his guess
680 (1905) (same); Dunphy v. Traveller Newspaper Association, 146 Mass. 495,
16 N.E. 426 (1888) (where wrongdoing treasurer owned majority of stock, demand
necessary on directors but not on members); S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v.
New England Theatre Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950) (vote
of independent, disinterested majority of shareholders against bringing action is
binding on minority shareholders).
9. The court pointed out that few policyholders know their voting rights or attend
meetings or sign proxies. In the past 50 years at the company involved here there
has never been a meeting at which even close to one per cent of eligible voters have
participated in person or by proxy. Most of those who did attend were friends of
the management. To require a policyhoder to reach all fellow members "would involve expenses far beyond the means of any but a few multimillionaires." On the
other hand, if he were to make a limited appeal for proxy votes, he would have to
file them seven days in advance of a meeting, thereby permitting the management
to get a larger, but not necessarily more disinterested, personal attendance at the
meeting than anticipated.
10. See Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence
of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE LJ. 267, 290 (1946).
11. See, e.g., CARWozo, LAW AND LITrEATRua AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 10 (1931), where he writes of decisions of "the type tonsorial or agglutinative, so called from the shears and the pastepot which are its implements and
emblem." See also Clark, supra note 10, at 271.
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will prove correct. Further, federal judges, aware that their decisions
cannot be set aright in a state appellate court, and also conscious of the
Erie mandate demanding uniformity, may actually feel less free in deciding
a case than would a lower state court judge. 2 A nicer balance between the
desire for uniformity and the exercise of a federal judge's broad magisterial
function ought to be striven for.

FEDERAL JURISDIcTION-REMOVAL OF CAUSES-WAIVER BY NoNRESIDENT DEFENDANT OF PRIVILEGE TO REMOVE WHEN REMOVABILITY
BECOMES APPARENT DURING TRIAL-Plaintiff

brought action against two

resident corporations and a nonresident corporation in a state court.

After

a jury was sworn, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his complaint against the
resident corporation and made his opening statements to the jury. At the
conclusion of the opening statements, defendant sought permission from the
state court to be granted an opportunity to remove to a federal court on the
ground that complete diversity of citizenship resulted from the dismissal.
The court denied the request and the trial proceeded until completion.
Thereafter defendant filed a removal petition in the appropriate federal
district court:' within the prescribed statutory period.2 That court granted
plaintiff's motion to remand, holding that, by waiting until the conclusion of
plaintiff's opening statements to the jury, defendant participated in the trial
in such a way as to waive its right to remove. Waldron v. Skelly Oil Co.,
101 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Mo. 1951).
Under the old removal statute, if a defendant desired to have the case
removed to the federal court he had to petition the state court "at any time
before [he was] required [to answer] by the laws of the State . . . in
which the suit was brought." 8 There was no specific provision to cover
causes which became removable after the time specified by the statute. In
such situations the courts followed the rule laid down in Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.,4 that in order to carry out the purpose of the removal
12. An example of a United States Court of Appeals feeling bound by a state
decision which lower state courts did not feel obliged to follow, is seen in Droste
v. Henry Atlas Sons, 147 F.2d 675, 677 (2nd Cir. 1945).
1. ". . . when a case becomes removable during the process of a trial, the right
to remove may be waived by proceeding with the trial without objection, but . . .
if timely objection is made the record is preserved and what happen[s] thereafter
does not prevent the removal." Instant case at 426.
2. Petition for removal may be filed within twenty days after removability becomes apparent. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (Supp. 1950).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 72 (1946).
4. 169 U.S. 92 (1898). This case was limited by the decision in Whitcomb v.
Smithson, 175 U.S. 637 (1899) to situations where the resident defendants were
voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff. For a recent development in this area see
Bradley v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 100 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Okla. 1951)
(death of resident defendant). But cf. Yulee v. Vose, 99 US. 539 (1879). For an
excellent discussion of the Powers-Whitcomb doctrine see Note, 60 HARv. L. REV.
959 (1947).
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statute defendant should be allowed to petition for removal as soon as the
action assumed a removable shape. 5 To this the courts added the undisputed dogma that the time limitation for removal was merely "modal and
formal", capable of being waived, 6 and thereby evolved a general rule which
required timely application for removal. Where cases became removable
during the trial because of voluntary dismissal of resident defendants by
plaintiff, courts required prompt action and non-participation in the trial
by the removing defendant." The second paragraph of § 1446(b) of the
Judicial Code, as amended in 1949, which deals with the time in which
removal may be taken provides:
"If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a petition for removal may be filed within twenty days after the receipt by
defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended
pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be
ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable." 8
This provision was intended to codify the line of decisions stemming from
the Powers case, 9 but no court has decided whether or not this paragraph
has any effect on the waiver doctrine.' 0
5. "The reasonable construction of the act of Congress, and the only one which
will prevent the right of removal, to which the statute declares the party to be entitled, from being defeated by the circumstances wholly beyond his control, is to hold
that the incidental provision as to time must when necesssary to carry out the purpose
of the statute, yield to the principle enactment as to the right; and to consider the
statute as, in intention and effect, permitting and requiring the defendant to file a
petition for removal as soon as the action assumes the shape of a removable case in
the court in which it was brought." Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 169 U.S.

92, 100 (1898).

6. Ayers v. Watson, 113 U.S. 595 (1894) (party at whose instance cause is removed is estopped from objecting that the removal was not made in the proper time) ;
Northern Pac. R.R. v. Austin, 135 U.S. 315 (1890) (defendant waived right to remove after plaintiff had amended the ad damnum clause).
7. Morgan's L. & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. Street, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 194, 122 S.W.
270 (1909), aff'd, 217 U.S. 599 (1910); Ford v. Roxanna Petroleum Corp., 31
F.2d 765 (N.D. Tex. 1929); Aetna Indemnity Co. v. City of Little Rock, 89 Ark.
95, 115 S.W. 960 (1909) ; Golden v. Northern Pac. Ry., 39 Mont. 435, 104 Pac. 549
(1909). It does not seem to matter at what stage in the proceeding removability appears so long as the request for removal is timely. Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry. 169 U.S. 92 (1898) (before trial started) ; So. Pac. Co. v. Haight, 126 F.2d 900
(9th Cir. 1942) (after plaintiff answered ready for trial); State ex rel. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co. v. Boone Circuit Court, 227 Ind. 327, 86 N.E.2d 74 (1949)
(after preliminary instruction to the jury but before argument) ; cf. Fogarty v. So.
Pac. Co., 121 Fed. 941 (S.D. Cal. 1903) (before trial).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (Supp. 1950).
9. "The second paragraph of the amendment to subsection (b) is intended to make
clear that the right of removal may be exercised at a later stage of the case if the
initial pleading does not state a removable case but its removability is subsequently
disclosed. This is declaratory of the existing rule laid down by the decisions. (See
for example, Powers v. Chesapeake etc. Ry. Co., 169 U.S. 92)." 2 U.S. CoDE CoNGRESSIONAL SERVICE, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1268 (1949).
10. Courts still speak of waiving the privilege of removal by failure to make
timely application even though the statute spells out a specific time in which to file
a petition to remove. See, e.g., General Phoenix Corp. v. Malyon, 88 F. Supp. 502,
503 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).

1952]

RECENT CASES

In the instant case the court reasoned that because a court could direct
a verdict after the opening statements of plaintiff's counsel, the defendant
had participated in the trial in such a way as to waive his privilege to
remove. This was indeed a harsh application of the waiver doctrine."
But what is more significant is the fact that the court reaffirmed the waiver
doctrine without considering whether it had been overturned by § 1446 (b).
TJie decision noted that defendant had filed in the federal court 12 within
the statutory time allowed but that there still might have been a waiver
because "the general principle in the old [statute], as well as the new, is
the same." 13 Apparently Congress, in its attempt to accomplish two ends,
did not consider that it might be inconsistent to incorporate them in one
provision. It desired to declare the Powers rule and thus codify the law
with respect to removability becoming apparent after the prescribed period
for removal. It also desired to make the time limitation on removal uniform.14 That the Powers decision was in addition concerned with the idea of

timely application for removal was evidently overlooked. According to a
plain reading of the statute it may be inferred that a petition within twenty
days of the time when removability becomes apparent is timely application. Such a reading, however, would be grotesque where the removability
became apparent during trial, and would militate against the most basic
consideration in limiting removal of causes, i.e., needless repetition and
delay of trials. While the insertion of a time limitation in the second paragraph of § 1446(b) creates an ambiguity, the decision in the instant case
indicates that the courts will continue to apply the waiver doctrine outside
the statute.
11. In concluding that defendant waived his privilege of removal, the court
rightly considered the intervening circumstances between the time removability became apparent and the time defendant expressed his intention to remove, but based
its decision solely on the fact that during that period the court might have nonsuited
the plaintiff. This is a dangerous criterion, for a court can enter a nonsuit at almost
any time during the trial. Any decision on waiver should be based on a consideration
of the purposes of limiting removal: the general attempt to limit federal jurisdiction,
the policy of avoiding repetition, and a desire to prevent delaying tactics by the defendant. On the other hand the court should consider the possibility of a fraudulent
joinder of parties to keep a non-resident defendant in the state court, the possibility
of local prejudice, and the willingness of defendant to go on with the case in the
state court. In the light of these considerations, the instant case should probably
have produced a different result.
12. No longer is defendant required to file his petition for removal in the state
court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 72 (1946). The new statute requires defendant to file his petition in the federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (a) (Supp. 1950). The
state court and adverse parties subsequently are given notice of this. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(e) (Supp. 1950). Defendant counsel in the instant case did not have to
request the state court for permission to remove. This was done probably because
of habit formed working with the old statute or out of courtesy toward the court.
If the waiver doctrine operates outside of the statute, then defendant must give the
state court notice of his intention to remove before he files to remove so that the
federal court can properly determine the issue of participation in the trial. The
statute lacks such a notice requirement.
13. Instant case at 426.
14. "The new removal statute was enacted primarily for the purpose of establishing uniformity of procedure with respect to removal and uniformity of time within
which removal could be taken." Instant case at 426.
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LIFE INSURANCE-BENEFICIARY'S ELECTION OF MODE OF SETTLEMENT A TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIoN-While the essence of a life insurance policy is a transfer of money at the insured's death, it is universally
conceded that this is not a testamentary disposition, nor is it made so if the
insured has reserved the right to change the beneficiary or to elect one of
several alternative modes of payment.' Where that election is made not by
the insured but by the beneficiary, 2 there is a paucity of authority as to the
testamentary character of any plan which limits an interest in the proceeds
vesting in enjoyment upon the beneficiary's death. In Hall v. Mutual
Beneficial Life Insurance Co.,3 the Supreme Court of New York recently
disturbed the insurance world by holding that the election of such a payment plan by the beneficiary was a testamentary act. The facts of the case
are by no means unusual. The beneficiary opted to receive the interest
on the insurance proceeds at three per cent for her life with the right to
withdraw all or part of the principal. On her death the remainder, if any,
was to go to her husband or his estate. This election differed from a
settlement option in the original policy only in that it prescribed quarterly
instead of annual interest payments.4 The court held that because of the
beneficiary's right of withdrawal, the agreement vested no present interest
in the remainder of the fund until her death. Consequently the settlement
was an attempted testamentary disposition and invalid for failure to comply
with the formal requirements for a will.5 Her estate and not the husband
was entitled to the proceeds.
The essential characteristic of a testamentary instrument is that it is
ambulatory, intended to create no rights in praesenti.6 Such an instrument
is.in its nature revocable, but that trait is no shibboleth because a variety of
commonly revocable arrangements such as life insurance contracts, Totten
trusts, and insurance trusts for reasons of practical politics are consistently
treated as non-testamentary, 7 although they likewise vest no enforceable interest in the beneficiary until the maker's death. To avoid the highly conceptual distinctions necessary to reconcile these decisions, the courts have
shown a marked tendency to categorize recurrent transactions and to decide
issues of testamentary character by classifying rather than by analyzing
1. See, e.g., Martin v. Modern Woodmen of America, 253 Ill. 400, 97 N.E. 693
(1912) ; Johnson v. Scott, 137 N.Y. Supp." 243 (1912); see Olson, Testamentary
Aspects of Life Insurance Contracts, 275 INs. L.J. 707, 708 (1945) ; Horton. The
Testamentary Nature of Settlements of Life Insurance Elected by the Beneficiary,
17 CoR. L.Q. 72 (1931).
2. Cf. Latterman v. tuardian Life Insurance Co., 280 N.Y. 102, 19 N.E.2d
978 (1939) (guardian was permitted to exercise the option of an incompetent beneficiary).
3. 109 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
4. The court specified no other variation.
5. N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATEs LAW § 21.
6. See 1 JARMAN, WiLLs 27 (1910); Bordwell, Testamentary Dispositions, 19
Ky. L.J. 281 (1931).
7. See Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills, 43 HARV. L. REv. 521, 529, 537
(1930) ; Phillips, The Testamentary Character of Personal Unfunded Life Insurance
Trusts, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 700 (1934).
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the effect of the arrangement in question in terms of the policy of the
statute of wills.8 While they present live doctrinal questions, as a class
life insurance transactions have been so generally treated as non-testamentary that it is surprising to find the issue raised in this area, and all the
more surprising to find the challenge sustained.
While the matter was once in doubt, it is now settled in New York
that even though an insurance contract contains trust language, if it provides for payment of a fixed rate of interest on unsegregated proceeds,
the relation between the insurance company and the beneficiary is that of
debtor and creditor.9 Similarly the remainderman in the instant case is
not a cestui que trust but holds an interest of contractual origin. Where
the settlement is contained in a supplementary contract, merely implementing one of the options of the original policy, the remainder may be
regarded as created by the insured by means of a provision for what is in
effect a power of appointment.' 0 Since that arrangement is an integral part
of a contract of insurance it likewise is very apt to be treated as nontestamentary. But when the settlement is in an independent contract, not
embodying an original option, the remainder was not created by the insured,
but by the beneficiary in a separate contract 11 which may not receive the
special treatment accorded insurance policies. While in the Hall case the
variance from the original option hardly seems so material as to require
the conclusion that the settlement contract is not supplementary but independent, if that is the ground on which the case rests, strict compliance
with any policy option will safeguard future transactions. However, from
the opinion it is not clear how much weight the court ascribes to the finding
of an independent contract. There is language to the effect that the policy
as a contract of insurance terminated with the death of the insured and that
the testamentary character of the agreement for the disposition of the
proceeds is not changed by being called supplementary.' 2 While this
approach renders crucial the aleatory element distinguishing insurance
contracts, it should be noted that that factor logically bears no relation to
8. See, e.g., In re Koss, 105 N.J. Eq. 29, 146 AUt. 471 (1929), rev'd, 106 NJ.
Eq. 323, 150 Atl. 471 (1930). This process casts suspicion on any transaction out

of the ordinary and is quite apt to create unfortunate precedents such as McCarthy
v. Pieret, 281 N.Y. 407, 24 N.E.2d 102 (1939), criticized in 1 ScoTr, TRuSTS
57.2 (Supp. 1952); Gulliver & Tillotson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers,
51 YAz L.J. 1, 30 (1941).
9. In re Nires, 290 N.Y. 78, 48 N.E.2d 268 (1943), Crossman v. Rauch, 263
N.Y. 264, 188 N.E. 748 (1934).
10. In this respect courts have distinguished life insurance policies from a will
because the policy does not operate on any property owned by the insured before his
death. Sigal v. Hartford National Bank & Trust Co., 119 Conn. 570, 177 AUt. 742
(1935); Mutual Beneficial Life Insurance Co. v. Ellis, 125 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1942).
11. The distinction between an independent and supplementary contract may also
be significant where the issue is whether 'there has been an acceptance of an offer
or a counter offer, Gram v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 N.Y. 375, 91 N.E.2d 307
(1951), or whether the consideration for a.spendthrift trust in the proceeds was
furnished by the beneficiary or the insured. See GaxswoLr, SPEcwHRWT TRUSTs
§487 (1947).
12. Instant case at 651.
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their testamentary character, 13 save that it calls on precedents in which
insurance is treated as sui generis. But even accepting the court's premise
that this settlement is a new contract and not one of insurance, the conclusion that it is testamentary does not necessarily follow.' 4
Under this payment plan the husband is a donee beneficiary of a contract between the insurance company and his wife.15 That she could reach
the proceeds of the policy meant only that his contract right was conditional.' 6 Previously courts have found no difficulty in permitting the donee
beneficiary of a life insurance contract to enforce his interest though it was
conditional and subject to divestment by the designation of a new beneficiary or the surrender or the assignment of the policy. 1 7 In neither the
present nor the usual insurance case is there a specific res. The contract
merely creates rights in a debt owed by the insurance company. On this
analysis the settlement can readily be regarded as vesting a present right in
the husband.' 8 There is weighty authority that such a transaction is not
testamentary merely because it remains open to modification or revocation
until the maker's death, 19 but the cases are not consistent,20 and much turns
22
It
on the maker's supposed intent 21 and the degree of control retained.
is verbiage to say that the statute of wills must be strictly applied, in view
of the convenient arrangements treated as non-testamentary though the
present interest given the donee is nebulous in the extreme. The instant
mode of settlement is a useful and reliable method of transfer. The public
policy represented in the ritualistic, evidentiary, and- protective functions of
13. See Kansas City Life Insurance Co. v. Rainey, 353 Mo. 477, 182 S.W.2d
624 (1944).
14. Mutual Beneficial Life Insurance Co. v. Ellis, 125 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1942).
15. 4 CoBIN, CoNTRACTs § 782 (1951).
16. Compare the cases concerning U.S. Saving Bonds made payable to a named
third party in event of the purchaser's death. Since by cashing in the bond the purchaser may terminate the contingent payee's right, a few courts have considered the
bond an attempted testamentary gift. See Deyo v. Adams, 36 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1942) ;
Decker v. Fowler, 199 Wash. 549, 92 P.2d 254 (1939). But they are a distinct
minority. See, e.g., In re Deyo's Estate, 42 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1943).
17. See Davis v. Modern Industrial Bank, 279 N.Y. 405, 18 N.E.2d 639 (1939).
18. New York law at one time required a "moral" obligation of the promises
to the third party before the latter could enforce the contract. The parties here are
within that rule which in any event appears to have been subsquently relaxed.
Seaver v. Ransome, 224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1918), Filardo v. Foley Bros., 279
N.Y. 217, 78 N.E.2d 480 (1948).
19. See Mutual Beneficial Life Insurance Co. v. Ellis, 125 F.2d 127 (2d Cir.
1942) ; cf. Society of Missionary Catechists v. Bradley, 112 Ind. App. 556, 44 N.E.2d
209 (1942); Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Rainey, 353 Mo. 477, 182 S.W.2d 624
(1944).
20. For New Jersey's extreme view, see American University v. Conover, 115
N.J.L. 468, 180 Atl. 830 (1935) (a pledge due at donee's death an attempted testamentary gift though no power to revoke was reserved).
21. See McCarthy v. Pieret, 281 N.Y. 407, 24 N.E.2d 102 (1939). In this case
a mortgage extension agreement making the interest payable to a third party if the
mortgagee died before a certain date was held invalid. Though no power of revocation
was reserved the court felt that there was no intent to transfer a present interest.
But cf. In re Fairbairn's Estate, 40 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1943).
22. This aspect is of pre-eminent importance in inter vivos trusts, see 1 ScoTr,
TRuSTS § 57.2 (Supp. 1952). The tax laws disregard these nice distinctions and
tax the income of any revocable trust to the settlor. INT. RaV. Coon § 166.
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the statute of wills is adequately fulfilled by the necessity of lodging written
communications with the insurance company.2 If not a contract of insurance, there is every reason that this payment plan should receive the same
treatment. Because of the millions which over the years have been paid
out in similar arrangements, the future of this case will be watched with
interest by insurance companies throughout the nation. Executors also
should be watchful, for if it is sustained 2 4 it will be their responsibility to
detect trifling variances and technical defects which will give hungry heirs
insurance proceeds not intended to be theirs. It is hoped that the Court
of Appeals, if offered the opportunity, will consider this a proper case to
particularize the practical considerations which militate toward finding
a present interest created in the donee, as opposed to the readily available
doctrinal alternative of a testamentary transaction.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-ASSIGNEE OF PURCHASER OF SUBDIVISION
MAY REQUIRE PERFORMANCE OF His ASSIGNOR'S VENDOR'S UNEXERCISED

OPTION TO PURCHASE THE WHOLE FROM OWNER-The

New York, New

Haven & Hartford R.R. leased certain real property, consisting of forty-one
acres and ten buildings, to the Bronx Whitestone Terminals Inc. The
lessee was granted an option to purchase for $282,500. Prior to the exercise of the option Bronx contracted to resell eleven acres of the property
containing one building to the plaintiff's assignor for $110,000. Upon
tender of performance by the plaintiff, Bronx refused to deliver a deed,
alleging that it was unable to obtain title from the Railroad. Plaintiff thereupon brought an action to compel the Railroad to perform its contract with
Bronx, and to direct Bronx to convey the eleven acres to the plaintiff. In
the Supreme Court, Special Term, the complaint against the Railroad was
dismissed on the ground that a contract will not be enforced in favor of one
who is neither a party to the contract, nor an assignee of an entire contract
nor a third party beneficiary. In reversing this decision the Appellate
Division held that the complaint against the owner-vendor stated a cause
of action. Geo. V. Clark Co. v. New York, New Haven & H. R.R., 279
App. Div. 39, 107 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1st Dep't 1951).
Specific performance has been granted an assignee of the vendee for
an entire land contract.1 Moreover, with the decline of mutuality of remedy
as a prerequisite for specific performance, 2 a subpurchaser of the entire4
3
property is permitted to enforce the contract. Third party beneficiaries
23. See Gulliver & Tillotson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE

L.J. 1 (1941) ; 1 Scoir, TRusTs §58.3 (Supp. 1952) suggests a similar jusification

of Totten trusts.
24. If the decision stands, a provision in the will paralleling the option or a trust
in the proceeds can safely effect the beneficiary's purposes.
1. Lenman v. Jones, 222 U.S. 51 (1911).
2. See, e.g., Driebe v. Fort Penn Realty Co., 331 Pa. 314, 200 Atl. 62 (1938).
3. Epstein v. Kroopf, 218 App. Div. 519, 218 N.Y. Supp. 644 (2d Dep't. 1926).
4. Gross v. Castleton Housing Corp., 271 App. Div. 980, 68 N.Y.S.2d 393 (2d
Dep't 1947) (Plaintiff held to have the right to seek specific performance of a public
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and those whom the court finds are in privity of relationship with a party 5
may also have the contract specifically enforced. The privity requirement
will be dispensed with, however, if the plaintiff can show sufficient interest
in the subject matter of the contract.' Both the majority and the dissenting
opinions in the principal case recognize that lack of privity should not be an
obstacle to the granting of specific performance. This is indicative of the
trend toward attaching less and less significance to the concept of privity.
7
Developments along this line have taken place in the law of contract,
9
While the dissenting justice would not dismiss the
sales," and torts.
complaint against the Railroad on the ground of lack of privity, he would
on the ground that the contract between the Railroad and Bronx is much
more extensive than the one between Bronx and the plaintiff's assignor.
It may be that he felt that either the price or the area of the tract which was
the subject 6f the original contract was so much greater than the price of
the building which the plantiff contracted for that it would be inequitable
to enforce. In any event it would seem, as the majority held, that a trial is
called for to inquire into the surrounding facts and circumstances in order to
determine what hardship would follow either the granting or the denial of a
decree, despite the fact that it is generally stated that judgment on the pleadings may readily be granted when they present no genuine issue of fact. 10
The result reached appears to be a proper one, for circuity of action and a
multiplicity of suits are avoided by bringing all the persons interested in
the subject of the action before the court for a final determination of their
rights." Had the decision in the lower court been -allowed to stand, it
might have meant that Bronx would have been required to sue the Railroad in a separate suit in order to obtain title.12
contract with the Federal Housing Administration, because of his third party beneficiary status as a potential tenant of any four room apartment in the project).
5. Privity may be of contract, blood, or estate, and is usually defined as successive
or mutual relationship to the same rights of property. Williams v. Barkley, 165
N.Y. 48, 58 N.E. 765, 768 (1900).
6. See, e.g., Mechanick v. Duschaneck, 99 NJ. Eq. 86, 87, 132 Atl. 854, 855
(1926).
7. Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1018).

8. DiVello v. Gardner Machine Co., 102 N.E.2d 289 (Ohio C.P. 1951) (Warranty of merchantability held to cover employee of the buyer, where latent defect in
grinding wheel caused his injury).
9. "The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding these days apace."

Cardozo, C.J. in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 225 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 447,
79 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 818 (1931)
10. See Note, Factors Affecting the Grant or Denial of Summary Judgment,

48 Coi. L. REv. 780 (1948).
11. "The general rule in equity requires that all persons interested in the subject
of the action should be made parties, in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits and
secure a final determination of their rights." Mahr v. The Norwich Union Fire
Insurance Society, 127 N.Y. 452, 460, 28 N.E. 391, 393 (1891).
12. Henschke v. Young, 224 Minn. 339, 28 N.W.2d 766 (1947) (in suit for specific

performance, vendor may not defend on ground of failure to make title marketable if

he has not proved that he cannot do it as agreed).
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. Allowing specific performance to the sub-purchaser of a portion of the
subject of the original contract may give rise to troublesome situations.
For example, where both of the parties to the original contract have become
unwilling to perform, the court may be asked to enforce both sides of the
contract in order to grant a decree to a third party. It may be determin&il
that it would not be equitable to enforce performance by the owner for
more than the sub-contracted portion. This would mean not only that
the court must revise the contract which the original parties made, but also
that a price must be determined in order to compensate the owner-vendor.18
This may be a difficult problem involving the salability of th6 tract remaining in the hands of the original vendor. Some of the factors which may
influence decisions in this area, in addition to the considerations which
are present in all cases of specific performance of land contracts, would
be the proportion that the portion re-sold bears to the entire parcel in terms
of physical size and monetary value, 14 the number of sub-conveyances
A study
made, 15 and the ability of the immediate vendee to perform.,
basis
a
sounder
provides
situation
factual
by
each
presented
equities
of the
reliance
on
than
uncritical
of
the
parties
of
the
rights
for the determination
privity.
or
trusteeship
subrogation,
of
concepts
legalistic

TRADE-MARKS--EFFECT OF REGISTRATION ON RIGHT TO USE THE
MARK IN AREAS IN WHICH REGISTRANT HAS NOT TRADnD--Plaintiff

registered the trade-mark "Sterling," applied to ale, in 1936 1 and again
in 1950 2 under the Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946.3 Its business was
confined to thirteen midwestern and southeastern states. In 1949, defendant, having actual knowledge of plaintiff's mark, started to sell ale in New
13. A possible solution to this problem is suggested by the case where an unconditional option to purchase demised premises, not specifying price or providing for
its determination, was construed as an offer to sell at a fair and reasonable price.
Shayeb v. Holland, 321 Mass. 492, 73 N.E.2d 73 (1947).
14. In the instant case although the area involved in the subpurchase was only
26.8% of the total area, the price of the subcontract was 38.9% of the original contract.
15. ". . . it appears to me that neither precedent nor reason sanctions a proceeding by which, on a single indivisible contract for sale of 800 acres of land, the
vendor may be subjected to an indefinite number of suits for specific performance by as
many persons as happen to become subcontractors under the vendee for distinct portions of the whole 800 acres, he it one acre or a hundred." Lord v. Underdunck, 1
Sandf. Ch. 46, 50 (N.Y. 1843).
16. Hoover v. Baugh, 108 Va. 695, 62 S.E. 968 (1908).
1. Registration No. 332,040. A descriptive word could not be registered under
the Act of 1905 unless it had been used for ten years prior to the Act, 33 STAT. 726
Plaintiff's mark had been used for beer since 1895; the extension regis(1905).
tration of it for ale was authorized by the Act of 1920, 41 STAT. 535 (1920), which
A descripalso prohibited registration of descriptive words, 41 STAT. 533 (1920).
tive mark may not be registered under the Lanham Act unless it has become distinctive of the applicant's goods. 60 STAT. 428, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (f) (1946).
2. Registration No. 526,392.
3. 60 STAT. 427, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1946).
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England under the name "Hacker's Sterling." ' In a suit to enjoin infringement, the court held, inter alia, that plaintiff's area of rise could not
reasonably be expected to expand to New England, that its mark had not
acquired a secondary meaning in that region, but that registration under
the Lanham Act entitled plaintiff to an injunction regardless of the geographical zone of its use. Sterling Brewing, Inc. v. Cold Spring Brewing
Corp., 100 F. Supp. 412 (D. Mass. 1951).4a
Prior to the Lanham Act, it was held in United Drug Co. v. Theodore
6
Rectanus Co.5 and similar cases that the owner of a mark, registered 7
or not," could'not obtain an injunction against future infringement by one
whose use had developed in good faith in an area in which the owner had
not traded. Several writers 9 have contended that the new Act modifies
the common law as expressed in these decisions by granting a registrant
the right to pre-empt the use of the mark in all commerce subject to federal control. 10 The present case is the first to support that contention,
which, if sustained, will increase incentives to register, decrease the number of marks available for adoption, and subject to actions for infringement and/or cancellation persons owning marks which another has previously registered and used in other regions.
The Lanham Act was designed to confer uniform substantive rights
on registrants and thus to avoid disparate modifications of common law
trade-mark rights by the states." There is considerable support in the Act
for the view that the right to exclusive use in commerce is one of the rights
granted. Section 33(b) 12 makes the certificate of registration of an incontestable mark 13 conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right
to use the mark in commerce on the goods specified therein. Section
33(a) 14 makes a certificate prima facie evidence of the exclusive right
4. Defendant's mark was not registered.
4a. The court later allowed defendant's motion that his acts within Massachusetts
not affecting the interstate commerce of plaintiff should be excluded from the scope
of the injunction. 92 U.S.P.Q. 37 (1952).
5. 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
6. E.g., U.S. Printing and Lithograph Co. v. Griggs, Cooper and Co., 279 U.S

156 (1929); Griesedieck Western Brewery Co. v. Peoples Brewing Co., 149 F.2d
1019 (8th Cir. 1945).

7. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
8. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
9. See, e.g., Diggins, The Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 37 T.M. REP. 305, 317
(1947); Halliday, Current Problens in Coiwurrent Registration, 41 T.M. REP. 3, 4
(1951); Lidy, The Lanham Act-An Atalysis, 37 T.M. REP. 87, 95 (1947) ; March,
Territorial Scope of the Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 38 T.M. REP. 955, 957 (1948);
Martin, The Defense of Trade-Mark and Unfair Competition Cases, 41 T.M. REP.
99, 109 (1951); RoBERT, THE NEw TRADE-MARK MANUAL 129, 130 (1947).

10. See 60 STAT. 443, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1946).
11. See 60 STAT. 443, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1946) and SEN. Rmx. No. 1333, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946).
12. 60 STAT. 438, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1946).
13. The right to use the mark becomes incontestable five years after registration,
provided all conditions are fulfilled, 60 STAT. 433, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1946).
14. 60 STAT. 438, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1946).
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when the mark has not become incontestable. This section is to be read in
conjunction with section 22 15 which makes registrations on the principal
register constructive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership of the
mark. Testimony at the hearings on the Lanham Bill and its predecessors
indicates that this provision was inserted in light of the holding in United
Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.18 that registration was not notice to
a subsequent user in a different area."1 It is maintained that, after the
effective date of the new Act, such subsequent use can be enjoined since a
user with constructive notice cannot be a user in good faith.' 8 According
to this reading, sections 33 and 22 indicate a grant of an exclusive right
of use in commerce.
On the other hand, this view is vulnerable to at least two objections.
The first is the language in 33 (a) 19 to the effect that where the certificate
is prima facie evidence of the exclusive right it does not bar any defense
which could have been asserted if the mark claimed to have been infringed
had not been registered. Strictly interpreted, "any defense" would include
the defense of good faith, i.e., lack of actual notice, where the areas of use
are separate. This reading is questionable since it denies to section 22 its
principal, if not only, effect. In any event, the argument applies only when
the mark has not become incontestable. The second and chief difficulty
encountered is the apparent antinomy of section 33 to section 32(1) (a),
which, despite the "exclusive right" language of section 33, authorizes an
injunction only when a "reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation" of the mark "is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive
purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods .... "20 This is not
merely a statement of the requirement that the marks in question be confusingly similar since that element is included in "colorable imitation" by
15. 60 STAT. 435, 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1946)
16. 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
17. Testimony of Mr. Karl Fenning, Mr. Edward S. Rogers and Mr. Wallace
H. Martin, as quoted in Halliday, Constructive Notice and Concurrent Registration,
38 T.M. Rx'. 111, 117-119 (1948).
18. In the instant case, defendant had actual notice. However, since Section 22
was inserted to overrule United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectam Co., see text at notes
16 and 17 supra, the result should be identical when there is only constructive notice.
It should be noted that this court cites section 22 in support of its holding.
It could be argued that the injunction in the instant case would have been issued
before the Act because defendant had actual notice and that, therefore, this case does
not demonstrate any change in the law. However, the Rectaius case merely indicated that there was good faith when there was no notice; it did not state that notice
alone would be sufficient to remove that good faith when there was no intent to
profit from plaintiff's reputation and no possibility of doing so, as in the instant
case. The fact that actual notice alone may not have been sufficient basis for an
injunction before the Act does not necessarily mean that the constructive notice of
section 22 is also insufficient for an injuction in the instant case, for section 22 has
the added support of the "exclusive right" language of section 33. The status of
constructive notice in re the good faith necessary to prevent an injunction in the
present situation is to be distinguished from constructive notice in re the good faith
usually necessary to assert the defense of laches when an injunction is sought against
infringement in the same area. See 100 U. OF PA. L. REV. 470 (1951).
19. 60 STAT. 438, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1946).
20. 60 STAT. 437, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1)(a) (1946).
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statutory definition. 2l At least one reason for the insertion of the clause
was the desire to achieve a greater degree of protection of the marks than
had been obtained under the Act of 1905, which authorized an injunction
only when the reproduction or imitation was affixed "to merchandise of
substantially the same descriptive properties" 22 as that of the registrant.23
It is arguable that no likelihood of confusion is possible when the uses occur
in different areas; however, by implication, section 2(d) envisages the possibility that confusion may result from such concurrent uses.2 4
What, then, will the clause be interpreted to mean where there is subsequent use of a registered mark in a separate area? In the instant case,
the court found that the resemblance between the two marks would deceive
the ordinary purchaser, but failed to explain how such deception could
occur when plaintiff's advertising in the region was negligible, his mark
had not acquired a secondary meaning there,25 and defendant's area of use
was beyond his potential zone of expansion.
Thus far, in cases where the two uses are in the same area but in
connection with different goods, judicial interpretations of the clause have
been incongruous. One court has condemned "unconscionable efforts...
to monopolize" 2 6 markets through exclusive use of a mark, while another
has emphasized the registrant's economic interest in preventing use of his
mark on other products, which may prove detrimental to his business
reputation.2 7 The language of these courts and the varying degrees of
protection given to the registrants in these cases indicate the prevalence
among the judiciary of the same fundamental division of policy that existed
between the proponents of the Lanham Act, who desired the greatest possible protection of trade-marks, 2 8 and the Department of Justice, which
was apprehensive of their allegedly monopolistic effects. By analogy, it is
probable that where the mark is used on the same goods in different areas
21. "The term colorable imitation includes any mark which so resembles a registered mark as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers."
60 STAT. 443, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1946).
22. 33 STAT. 728 (1905).
23. Lunsford, Trademark Infringement and Confusion of Source: Need for Supreme Court Action, 35 VA. L. REv. 214, 223 (1949).
24. Concurrent registrations may be permitted only when there have been lawful
concurrent uses before the filing dates of the applications involved and it is determined
that confusion and mistake is not likely to result from continued uses of the marks.
60 STAT. 428, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1946). The fact that this determination must be
made indicates that confusion and mistake may result from concurrent uses, i.e., uses
in separate areas.
25. It seems more probable that there may be likelihood of confusion in separate
areas when the mark is not descriptive, i.e., in the majority of cases. See note 1
sup ra.
26. California Fruit Growers Exchange v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F.2d 971,
976 (7th Cir. 1947).. See also S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176,
179 (2d Cir. 1949).
27. Safeway Stores, Inc. v.Dinnel, 172 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1949). For a lucid
discussion of the scope of protection under the Lanham Act in cases where the mark
is used on different goods, see Lunsford, Trademark Infringement and Confusion of
Source: Need for Supreme Court Action, 35 VA. L. REv. 214 (1949).
28. SEN. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1946).

19521

RECENT CASES

the same policy division will produce incongruous interpretations of "confusion and mistake," especially since in this problem, unlike the problem
of use on different goods,2 9 there is no case law prior to the Act to rely on.
Because section 33 so clearly demonstrates an intent to create an exclusive
right to use in commerce, it would seem that, purely as a matter of statutory
construction, the restriction on injunctive remedy in section 32 should be
narrowly interpreted to afford maximum protection in the present situation.
If the instant case is affirmed on appeal, and its holding generally prevails,
questions may well arise as to whether the registrant may be charged with
abandonment if he does not trade in the unexploited region within two
years 30 and whether he may assign the right to use the mark in that area
31
only.
29. See Judge Hand's opinion in S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F.2d

176, 179 (2d Cir. 1949) and cases cited therein. Liberal interpretation of "confusion

and mistake" may be more justifiable vhere the mark is used on different goods since
the certificate is evidence of the right to use "on the goods or services specified. . . ." 60 STAT. 438, 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (1946).
30. A mark is abandoned if use is discontinued with intent not to resume. Nonuse for two years is prima facie abandonment. 60 STAT. 443, 15 U.S.C., § 1127

(1946).
31. Registered marks are assignable. 60

STAT.

431, 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1946).

